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 The Evolution of Interstate 
Arbitration and the Peaceful 




There is no single natural resource on which the world depends more than 
freshwater.1 Beyond basic human survival, it is required for food and energy pro-
duction and is closely related to fundamental national and international interests 
such as socio-economic development and national security.  Unfortunately, climate 
change, depletion of resources, population growth, unequal distribution, and ineffi-
cient use all mean that freshwater is rapidly becoming a scarce resource,2 aptly 
named the “Blue Gold.”3  Further fueling the competition over freshwater is the fact 
that many of the freshwater resources available for human consumption are not con-
tained within national borders, but are rather unevenly distributed among two or 
more states.4  As states strive to take advantage of shared freshwater passing through 
their territory, they often disregard or harm the interests of other states and disputes 
may arise as a result. Such disputes tend to involve political, economic, legal, and 
technical problems;5 they concern a broad spectrum of water-related issues, such as 
ownership, allocation, use, and quality; and they may deteriorate into violent con-
flicts. 
While it is often correctly pointed out that interstate disputes over freshwater 
have not escalated into a full blown ‘water war’6 in thousands of years, it is also 
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 1. Colleen P. Graffy, Water, water, everywhere, Nor any drop to drink: The Urgency of Transna-
tional Solutions To International Riparian Disputes, 10 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 402, 402 (1998). 
 2. Id. at 403-405. 
 3. Pierre Thielbörger, Governing International Watercourses: Implications of the Human Rights to 
Water, in WATER LAW AND COOPERATION IN THE EUPHRATES-TIGRIS REGION: A COMPARATIVE AND 
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 45 (Aysegül Kibaroglu et al. eds., 2013). 
 4. These include 276 international river basins and 273 transboundary aquifer systems.  WORLD 
WATER ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME (“WWAP”), THE UNITED NATIONS WORLD WATER DEVELOPMENT 
REPORT 4: MANAGING WATER UNDER UNCERTAINTY AND RISK, at 31-32 (2012), 
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/natural-sciences/environment/water/wwap/wwdr/wwdr4-2012/. 
 5. F.J. Berber, The Indus Water Dispute, 6 INDIAN Y.B. INT’L AFF. 46, 60 (1957). 
 6. Defined as “interstate violence that involve[s] water specifically as a scarce and/or consumable 
resource or as a quantity to be managed.”  Juha I. Uitto & Aaron T. Wolf, Water Wars? Geographical 
Perspectives: Introduction 168 GEOGRAPHIC J. 289, 289 (2002). The last known “water war” was fought 
some 4500 years ago between the ancient Mesopotamian states of Lagash and Umma.  Patricia Wouters, 
Universal and Regional Approaches to Resolving International Water Disputes: What Lessons Learned 
From State Practice?, in RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL WATER DISPUTES: PAPERS EMANATING 
FROM THE SIXTH PCA INTERNATIONAL LAW SEMINAR, NOVEMBER 8, 2002, at 112 n.2 (The Int’l Bureau 
of the Permanent Court of Arbitration eds., 2003). 
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important to note that over 150 water-related conflicts have been recorded between 
1900-2010,7 and that 60% of the world’s international river basins currently lack 
any type of cooperative management framework that might assist in preventing or 
resolving future conflicts.8  Not surprisingly, many political leaders, diplomats, and 
scholars predict that freshwater scarcity will lead to violent war in the future,9 and 
in some regions, such as South Asia, assessments have indicated that ‘water wars’ 
cannot be expected to continue being avoided in perpetuity.10  In short, the fact that 
freshwater is rapidly running out while human dependency on it continues to grow 
suggests that disputes between states over shared freshwater resources are likely to 
arise with increasing frequency and that attention must be paid to their peaceful and 
effective resolution.  Such attention is necessary since “[w]ater is one of the few 
scarce resources for which there is no substitute, over which there is poorly devel-
oped international law.”11 
Indeed, even though the core principles of international water law12 are com-
monly viewed as forming part of customary international law,13 their interpretation 
remains controversial14 and the main multilateral treaty codifying them has failed 
                                                          
 7. Peter H. Gleick & Matthew Heberger, Water Conflict Chronology, in 7 THE WORLD’S WATER: 
THE BIENNIAL REPORT ON FRESHWATER RESOURCES 175-214 (2011). 
 8. WWAP, supra note 4, at 32. 
 9. See, e.g., GRAFFY, supra note 1, at 401 n.13, (managing of freshwater is “the single greatest envi-
ronmental challenge facing the international community.”) (quoting PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 365 (1995)).  See also GRAFFY, supra note 1, at 408 n.62 (re-
ferring to quotes by Ismail Serageldin, Vice President of the World Bank that “the wars of the next 
century will be about water,” and by Boutros Boutros Ghali that “the next war in the Middle East would 
be over [water], not politics.”); Stephen C. McCaffrey, If Water Respects No Political Boundaries, Does 
Politics Respect Transboundary Waters?, 102 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. & PROC. 353, 353 (2008). “[T]he 
only matter that could take Egypt to war again is water,” Patricia Kameri-Mbote, Water, Conflict, and 
Cooperation: Lessons From the Nile River Basin, 4 NAVIGATING PEACE, Jan. 2007, at 1, 
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/NavigatingPeaceIssuePKM.pdf (quoting Anwar Sad-
dat). See also Kofi Annan, Sec’y Gen., U.N., Address at the 97th Annual Meeting of the Association of 
American Geographers (Mar. 1, 2001) (transcript available at https://iguwater.word-
press.com/news/speech-of-mr-kofi-annan-general-secretary-of-the-united-nations-during-the-97th-
meeting-of-the-association-of-american-geographers/ (last visited Dec. 31, 2016)) (“[F]ierce competi-
tion for fresh water may well become a source of conflict and wars in the future.”). 
 10. MAJORITY STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 112TH CONG., AVOIDING WATER 
WARS: WATER SCARCITY AND CENTRAL ASIA’S GROWING IMPORTANCE FOR STABILITY IN 
AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN 12 (Comm. Print 2011), http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/me-
dia/doc/Senate%20Print%20112-10%20Avoiding%20Water%20Wars%20Water%20Scar-
city%20and%20Central%20Asia%20Afgahnistan%20and%20Pakistan.pdf. 
 11. JEROME DELLI PRISCOLI & AARON T. WOLF, MANAGING AND TRANSFORMING WATER 
CONFLICTS 1 (2010). 
 12. This refers to the body of international law governing non-navigational water uses, and should be 
distinguished from international law governing navigation, maritime issues, and the High Seas, which is 
generally considered to be well-developed.  Joseph Dellapenna & Joyeeta Gupta, Toward Global Law 
on Water, 14 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 437, 446 (2008); Salman M.A. Salman, The Helsinki Rules, the 
UN Watercourses Convention and the Berlin Rules: Perspectives on International Water Law, 23 INT’L 
J. WATER RESOURCES DEV. 625, 625 (2007). 
 13. Stephen McCaffrey, International Water Cooperation in the 21st Century: Recent Developments 
in the Law of International Watercourses, 118 WATER RESOURCES UPDATE 11, 11 (2001). 
 14. STEPHEN MCCAFFREY, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES 450 (2d ed. 2007). 
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to gain wide acceptance.15  It is hardly surprising, therefore, that disputes over fresh-
water cannot be readily solved by juridical decisions.16  States are thus reluctant to 
submit transboundary freshwater disputes (TFDs) for legal resolution by an inter-
national court17 and most often attempt to resolve such disputes by way of bilateral 
negotiation or non-binding third-party mechanisms such as mediation, conciliation, 
and good offices.18  However, as illustrated by the protracted disputes over the Nile 
River in Africa and the Amu Darya and Syr Darya Rivers in Central Asia, for in-
stance, such mechanisms are not always effective in resolving TFDs.19  Arbitra-
tion,20 on the other hand, presents an effective and flexible alternative for the reso-
lution of TFDs and it has long been suggested that “more conscious attention to the 
art and science of . . . arbitration can provide useful insights for resolving these 
conflicts without recourse to the limited solutions possible in international courts of 
law or, worse, the devastating possibility of armed conflict.”21 
This Article sets out to examine the potential for arbitration to be effectively 
employed by states in the resolution of TFDs.  Part II will describe the unique nature 
of TFDs, briefly examine the international law principles governing such disputes 
as well as the main mechanisms used for their resolution, and evaluate their ade-
quacy.  Part III will suggest a new approach to interstate arbitration, intended to 
‘revive’ it in the context of TFD resolution.  The first element of this approach calls 
for a return to the original purpose and true nature22 of arbitration, which rather than 
constituting a purely legal mechanism similar to judicial settlement,23 was intended 
to be a more flexible, just, and quasi-diplomatic alternative to it.  This view pre-
scribes very different roles to arbitrators, international law, and extra-legal consid-
erations in the resolution of interstate disputes, and places arbitration midway be-
tween judicial settlement and non-legal mechanisms on the spectrum of interstate 
                                                          
 15. As of 19 December 2016, the UN Watercourses Convention had 16 signatories and 36 parties, 
Chapter XXVII Environment, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, https://trea-
ties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-12&chapter=27&clang=_en 
(last visited Dec. 24, 2016). 
 16. Edda Kristjánsdóttir, Resolution of Water Disputes: Lessons from the Middle East, in 
RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL WATER DISPUTES: PAPERS EMANATING FROM THE SIXTH PCA 
INTERNATIONAL LAW SEMINAR 351, 354 (Int’l Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration ed., 2003). 
 17. Lucius Caflisch, Judicial Means for Settling Water Disputes, in RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL 
WATER DISPUTES: PAPERS EMANATING FROM THE SIXTH PCA INTERNATIONAL LAW SEMINAR 235, 236 
(Int’l Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration ed., 2003). 
 18. Awn S. Al-Khasawneh, Do judicial decisions settle water-related disputes? in INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND FRESHWATER: THE MULTIPLE CHALLENGES 341, 343 (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, 
Christina Leb & Mara Tignino eds., 2013). 
 19. Marit Brochmann & Paul R. Hensel, The Effectiveness of Negotiations over International River 
Claims 55 INT’L STUD. Q. 859 (2011) (showing that negotiation of water disputes is successful only 
under certain conditions). 
 20. International arbitration has been defined as “a means by which international disputes can be de-
finitively resolved, pursuant to the parties’ agreement, by independent, non-governmental decision-mak-
ers.”  GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 1 
(2d ed. 2001). 
 21. Aaron T. Wolf, International Water Conflict Resolution: Lessons from Comparative Analysis, 13 
INT’L J. WATER RESOURCES DEV. 333, 334 (1997). 
 22. M.C.W. Pinto, Structure, Process, Outcome: Thoughts on the ‘Essence’ of International Arbitra-
tion, in THE FLAME REKINDLED: NEW HOPES FOR INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 43, 44 (Sam Muller & 
Wim Mijs eds., 1994). 
 23. Settlement by an international permanent court operating on the basis of predetermined procedural 
rules and producing binding decisions based on the applicable rules of international law. Caflisch, supra 
note 17, at 236. 
3
Meshel: The Evolution of Interstate Arbitration And The Peaceful Resoluti
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
364 JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 2016 
dispute resolution processes, thus making it particularly suitable for the resolution 
of TFDs.  The second element of the proposed approach sets out to revamp the 
Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Natural Resources and/or 
the Environment24 of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in the original 
quasi-diplomatic spirit of arbitration.  While the Rules were celebrated as innovative 
when first adopted in 2001, they have been scarcely used by states to resolve envi-
ronmental disputes, and have not been used at all in the TFD context.  At the same 
time, no other permanent institution or tribunal has been created specifically for the 
resolution of TFDs.  This Article will argue that the PCA and the Rules continue to 
present the greatest potential in this regard, however the Rules should be adapted to 
the specific context of TFDs and the quasi-diplomatic nature of arbitration. 
II. INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW, TFDS AND THEIR RESOLUTION 
For present purposes, a TFD is a dispute that:25 
1) Occurs between two or more states, including non-contiguous states, con-
cerning an international drainage basin. It therefore does not include water-related 
disputes between states and individuals, organizations, or communities (e.g., before 
investment or human rights tribunals), domestic disputes between units of federal 
countries, or disputes between private individuals or communities; 
2) Concerns fresh surface water (e.g., rivers, lakes) and groundwater resources 
(e.g., aquifers), but only with respect to four main water utilization issues: (a) allo-
cation (e.g., ownership and sovereignty rights); (b) quantity (e.g., dams and diver-
sions); (c) quality (e.g., pollution); and (d) rights of use (e.g., infrastructure, irriga-
tion, and hydropower). Excluded disputes are those that mainly concern river 
boundaries and the ownership of territory in which freshwater is located or of is-
lands, navigation, maritime issues (e.g., offshore waters, maritime boundaries, con-
tinental shelves, territorial seas, EEZs, and the High seas), disputes in which water 
was used as an instrument of conflict rather than the object of the conflict, and dis-
putes between states concerning claims made on behalf of nationals or companies; 
and 
3) Exhibits a sufficient level of conflictual interaction between the disputing 
states. This is assessed on the basis of the Conflict and Peace Databank’s 
(COPDAB) International Co-operation and Conflict Scale, as adapted to water-re-
lated disputes.26 Accordingly, ‘disputes’ are not limited to situations involving for-
mal declarations of war or military acts, but include also situations involving 
                                                          
 24. PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, PCA OPTIONAL RULES FOR ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES 
RELATING TO THE ENVIRONMENT AND/OR NATURAL RESOURCES (2001), http://pca-cpa.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/sites/175/2016/01/Optional-Rules-for-Arbitration-of-Disputes-Relating-to-the-Environ-
ment-and_or-Natural-Resources.pdf. 
 25. This definition of a transboundary fresh water dispute is intended to achieve several interrelated 
objectives: (a) focus on those disputes that most concern the use of fresh water (rather than the allocation 
of territory or water as an instrument of war); (b) focus on those disputes that are most salient to states 
and their national interests (rather than the interests of nationals or companies); and (c) focus on the most 
complex and contentious disputed issues (rather than those that are governed by relatively clear and 
accepted international laws or norms, such as navigation issues). 
 26. Shira Yoffe et al., Geography of International Water Conflict and Cooperation: Data Sets and 
Applications, 40 WATER RESOURCES RES., May 2004, at 11, http://onlineli-
brary.wiley.com/doi/10.1029/2003WR002530/epdf. 
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“strong verbal expressions displaying hostility,” “diplomatic-economic hostile ac-
tions,” or “political-military hostile actions,” as defined in the COPDAB Scale.27  
On the other hand, an interaction, claim, or event is not considered to constitute a 
dispute if it is not sufficiently significant and meaningful. Such situations may in-
volve “mild verbal expressions displaying discord in interaction” and “neutral or 
non significant acts for the inter-nation situation” as defined in the COPDAB Scale, 
or mere indicators of conflict or potential for conflict.28 
The current legal framework governing the use of shared freshwater and the 
resolution of TFDs arising from such use is that of international water law, which 
is largely based on the limited territorial sovereignty doctrine.29  This doctrine lies 
midway between the more extreme theories of absolute territorial sovereignty, the 
“Harmon Doctrine,” according to which a state is entitled to do as it pleases with 
waters in its boundaries without regard to its co-riparians, and absolute territorial 
integrity, according to which no state sharing a water resource may make any 
changes to it that restrict the supply of water to a co-riparian.30  Limited territorial 
sovereignty is intended to serve as a “mutual limitation of sovereign rights”31 and 
is based on the two core substantive principles of equitable and reasonable utiliza-
tion (ERU) and no significant harm (NSH).32 
The ERU principle, rooted in the sovereign equality of states,33 is considered 
by most water law experts to be the basic, governing principle of international water 
law governing non-navigational uses of shared freshwater resources.34  “It entitles 
each basin state to a reasonable and equitable share of water resources for the ben-
eficial uses within its own territory,”35 so that each state sharing a water resource 
has “an equal right to an equitable share of the uses and benefits” of that resource36 
and is under an obligation to “use the watercourse in a manner that is equitable and 
reasonable”37 vis-à-vis the other states sharing the resource.  Riparians are therefore 
                                                          
 27. Id. at 4. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See, e.g., Dellapenna & Gupta, supra note 12, at 444-45; MCCAFFREY, supra note 14, at 141-42. 
 30. Id. at 113-14. 
 31. Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J. Toope, The Nile Basin Regime: A Role For Law?, in WATER 
RESOURCES PERSPECTIVES: EVALUATION, MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 93, 106 (A.S. Alsharhan & W.W. 
Wood eds., 2003). 
 32. Some view the obligation to protect international watercourses and their ecosystems as an addi-
tional substantive principle of international water law governing non-navigational uses. MCCAFFREY, 
supra note 14, at 446-62. For present purposes, this principle is considered as falling within the broader 
“no harm” principle. 
 33. Mohammed S. Helal, Sharing Blue Gold: The 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navi-
gational Uses of International Watercourses Ten Years On, 18 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 337, 
342 (2007). 
 34. MCCAFFREY, supra note 14, at 384.  See also, e.g., Alistair Rieu-Clarke & Flavia Rocha Loures, 
Still not in Force: Should States Support the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention?, 18 REV. EUR. COMP. 
& INT’L L.  185, 188 (2009); OWEN MCINTYRE, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION OF INTERNATIONAL 
WATERCOURSES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 85 (2007). 
 35. Muhammad Mizanur Rahaman, Principles of international water law: creating effective trans-
boundary water resources management, 1 INT’L J. SUSTAINABLE SOC’Y 207, 210 (2009). 
 36. MCCAFFREY, supra note 14, at 391-92. 
 37. Stephen McCaffrey, The Law of International Watercourses: Present Problems, Future Trends, 
in A LAW FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 113, 114 (Alexandre Charles Kiss & Françoise Burhenne-Guilmin 
eds., 1994). 
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“bound to act so as to conform with the principle of equity.”38  However, the prac-
tical challenge of determining what constitutes each state’s fair share and what con-
duct or use should be considered equitable and reasonable under this principle,39 
has yet to be overcome.  Therefore, while “the notion of equity has evolved as the 
only suitable standard to accommodate all likely factors and circumstances that 
must be taken into account when reconciling competing interests,”40 it has also been 
criticized for providing no practical guidelines for water allocation.41 
The NSH principle has its roots in states’ general obligation under international 
law not to use their territory in such a way as to cause harm to another state.42  It 
thus prohibits states in an international drainage basin to use the watercourses in 
their territory in a way that would cause significant harm to other basin states or to 
their environment.43  The obligation not to cause such significant transboundary 
harm has been articulated in the following terms: 
States have . . . the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant 
to their own environmental and developmental policies, and the responsi-
bility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not 
cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction.44 
Both the ERU and the NSH principles are considered to be fundamental prin-
ciples of international water law45 and as “two sides of the same coin.”46  Nonethe-
less, their interrelationship remains controversial47 and they continue to be viewed 
by states as competing, elusive, legally indeterminate, and vague.48  Unless the 
                                                          
 38. MCCAFFREY, supra note 14, at 146, (citing PAUL FAUCHILLE, TRAITÉ DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 
PUBLIC (8th ed. 1925)). 
 39. HILAL ELVER, PEACEFUL USES OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS: THE EUPHRATES AND TIGRIS RIVERS 
DISPUTE 136-37 (2002). 
 40. Alistair Rieu-Clarke & Alexander Lopez, Factors that could limit the effectiveness of the UNWC, 
in THE UN WATERCOURSES CONVENTION IN FORCE: STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR 
TRANSBOUNDARY WATER MANAGEMENT 77, 87 (Flavia Rocha Loures & Alistair Rieu-Clarke eds., 
2013). 
 41. Owen McIntyre, Utilization of shared international freshwater resources – the meaning and role 
of “equity” in international water law, 38 WATER INT’L 112, 112 (2013).  For instance, the ERU prin-
ciple was referenced by the ICJ in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, however its application failed to 
resolve the dispute and the Court “essentially deferred the adjustment of the balance between environ-
mental protection and economic development to the parties themselves.” Tim Stephens, International 
environmental disputes: to sue or not to sue?, in LITIGATING INTERNATIONAL LAW DISPUTES: 
WEIGHING THE OPTIONS 284, 298 (Natalie Klein ed., 2014). 
 42. Also known as the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum no laedas. 
 43. Rahaman, supra note 35, at 210-11. 
 44. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and Devel-
opment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), annex I (Aug. 12, 1992). 
 45. Salman M.A. Salman, The Future of International Water Law: Regional Approaches to Shared 
Watercourses?, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W. 
MICHAEL REISMAN 907, 918 (Mahnoush Arsanjani et al. eds., 2010); Stephen McCaffrey, The UN Con-
vention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses: Prospects and Pitfalls, 
in INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES-ENHANCING COOPERATION AND MANAGING CONFLICT 17, 26-27 (Sal-
man M. A. Salman & Laurence Boisson de Chazournes eds., 1998). 
 46. MCCAFFREY, supra note 14, at 436. 
 47. Id. at 450. 
 48. EYAL BENVENISTI, SHARING TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES 163 (2002); Shlomi Dinar, Assessing 
Side-payment and Cost-sharing Patterns in International Water Agreements: The Geographic and Eco-
nomic Connection, 25 POL. GEOGRAPHY 412, 415 (2006); Halla Qaddumi, Practical approaches to 
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states sharing a freshwater resource agree on a common interpretation of the inter-
national water law principles of ERU and NSH, it is not always clear which of them 
should take precedence in the resolution of TFDs and they may be interpreted in 
contradictory ways.49  Therefore, applying these principles in the resolution of 
TFDs has proven difficult50 and has resulted in their infrequent use by states.51 
This is particularly evident in TFDs between upstream and downstream states, 
where, for instance, an upstream state increases its use of the shared waters for hy-
dropower production, which may reduce the water supply to the downstream state 
for its agricultural water needs.52  In such a scenario, the upstream state might in-
voke the ERU principle to protect its interests in the utilization of the shared waters, 
while the downstream state might emphasize the NSH principle for the same pur-
pose.  Since the main users of transboundary freshwater resources have historically 
been downstream states,53 a similar scenario could result from such a state’s con-
tinuous development of a shared freshwater resource to the point where it threatens 
an upstream state’s reasonable future use.54  Since these principles are “still too 
rudimentary and vague to be able to deal comprehensively and efficiently with the 
complexity and subtlety of international water disputes,” states may refrain from 
applying them in the resolution of such TFDs and avoid mechanisms that rely on 
them, such as judicial settlement.55  At the same time, international water law does 
not provide for a specific alternative mechanism that states should use in the reso-
lution of TFDs, and as lex specialis it thus adds little to states’ existing obligation 
                                                          
transboundary water benefit sharing 6 (Overseas Dev. Inst., Working Paper No. 292, 2008), 
http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/2576.pdf.  See also, 
Christine Traversi, The Inadequacies of the 1997 Convention on International Water Courses and 2008 
Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers, 33 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 453, 476, 481 (2011); Olivia 
Odom & Aaron T. Wolf, Institutional resilience and climate variability in international water treaties: 
the Jordan River Basin as “proof-of-concept,” 56 HYDROLOGICAL SCI. J. 703, 705 (2011); Malgosia 
Fitzmaurice & Gerhard Loibl, Current State of Development in the Law of International Watercourses, 
in INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 19, 33 (Surya P. Subedi ed., 2005); 
B.S. Chimni, A Tale of Two Treaties: The Gange and Mahakali Agreements and the Watercourses Con-
vention, in INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 63, 102 (Surya P. Subedi ed., 
2005).  Some contest this claim, see, e.g., MCCAFFREY, supra note 14, at 407-408, 436, 445. 
 49. Marwa Daoudy, Hydro-hegemony and international water law: laying claims to water rights, 10 
WATER POLICY 89, 95 (Supp. 2 2008); NAHID ISLAM, THE LAW OF NON-NAVIGATIONAL USE OF 
INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES: OPTIONS FOR REGIONAL REGIME BUILDING IN ASIA 140, 142 (2010). 
 50. Daoudy, supra note 49, at 95; ISLAM, supra note 49, at 140, 142. 
 51. INTERNATIONAL WATERS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 75-76 (Mikiyasu Nakayama ed., 2003); 
CHRISTINA LEB, COOPERATION IN THE LAW OF TRANSBOUNDARY WATER RESOURCES 104 (2013). One 
study examining the inclusion of legal principles in international river agreements has found that “equi-
table use” as a specific water allocation mechanism was included only in 26% of the agreements sur-
veyed, and that the principle of “avoiding significant harm to other” was included in 27% of the agree-
ments.  Ken Conca, Fengshi Wu & Joanne Neukirchen, Swimming Upstream: In Search of a Global 
Regime for International Rivers, in GOVERNING WATER: CONTENTIOUS TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS AND 
GLOBAL INSTITUTION BUILDING 93, 111 (Ken Conca 2006). 
 52. MCCAFFREY, supra note 14, at 410. 
 53. ELVER, supra note 39, at 139. 
 54. MCCAFFREY, supra note 14, at 412-13; David Grey & Dustin Garrick, Water security, perceptions 
and politics: the context for international watercourse negotiations, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
FRESHWATER: THE MULTIPLE CHALLENGES 37, 46 (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Christina Leb & 
Mara Tignino, eds., 2013). 
 55. Al-Khasawneh, supra note 18, at 341. 
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under general international law to resolve disputes peacefully by way of “negotia-
tion, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to re-
gional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.”56 
In the TFD context,57 the dispute resolution mechanisms most commonly used 
by states are bilateral negotiation58 and third-party non-binding mechanisms.59 
A. Bilateral Negotiation 
States most often attempt to resolve TFDs by way of bilateral non-binding 
mechanisms, and there is a long history of recourse to such mechanisms in the res-
olution of these disputes.60 The 1911 Madrid Declaration,61 for instance, provided 
for the creation of permanent joint commissions for the resolution of water disputes, 
and a similar provision was included in the 1923 Geneva Convention,62 1961 Salz-
burg Resolution,63 and 1966 Helsinki Rules.64 Joint commissions have indeed been 
established in relation to many shared freshwater resources.65 The tendency of states 
to resort to bilateral non-binding mechanisms such as joint commissions may in part 
be a result of the “vague standards” of international water law, which may cause 
states to proceed with negotiations until agreement is reached, rather than enter into 
litigation with unpredictable results.66  Bilateral negotiation also allows the parties 
to control the process and the outcome; provides a generally simpler and less costly 
procedure; and favors a compromise.  Moreover, the parties, who are best placed to 
develop a workable solution, are themselves responsible for resolving the dispute 
and any settlement devised by them is thus more likely to be accepted than an im-
posed settlement.67 
However, bilateral non-binding mechanisms may also prove ineffective in re-
solving disputes since a negotiated settlement may reflect the parties’ relative ne-
gotiating power, it is inherently political and therefore subject to external pressures, 
and the parties may not have access to technical expertise required for the resolution 
                                                          
 56. U.N. Charter art. 33, ¶ 1. 
 57. The present discussion concerns only the use of dispute resolution mechanisms in the resolution 
of TFDs. While some mechanisms have proven useful in managing shared resource and preventing dis-
putes, they are arguably limited in their ability to resolve TFDs effectively and efficiently once these 
have arisen. DELLI PRISCOLI & WOLF, MANAGING AND TRANSFORMING WATER CONFLICTS 7, 9 (2010). 
 58. This includes, e.g., bilateral negotiations, consultations, and diplomacy. 
 59. These include, e.g., mediation, conciliation, good offices, fact-finding, joint institutions or com-
missions, and any other non-binding process involving a third party, whether a State, organization or an 
individual. 
 60. Stephen C. McCaffrey, Water Disputes Defined: Characteristics and Trends for Resolving Them, 
in RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL WATER DISPUTES: PAPERS EMANATING FROM THE SIXTH PCA 
INTERNATIONAL LAW SEMINAR 49, 89 (Int’l Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration ed., 2003); 
Caflisch, supra note 17. 
 61. INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW: SELECTED WRITINGS OF PROFESSOR CHARLES B. BOURNE 206 
(Patricia Wouters ed., 1997) [hereinafter Wouters]. 
 62. Geneva Convention Relative to the Development of Hydraulic Power Affecting more than One 
State and Protocol of Signature, art. 12, Dec. 9, 1923, 36 L.N.T.S. 77. 
 63. Wouters, supra note 61, at 296. 
 64. Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, in REPORT OF THE FIFTY-SECOND 
CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION HELD AT HELSINKI, AUGUST 14-20, 1966, at 
486, 488 (arts. XXXI-XXXIII) (1967). 
 65. For a partial list see Wouters, supra note 61, at 119, n.18. 
 66. Kristjánsdóttir, supra note 16, at 355. 
 67. Richard B. Bilder, International Third Party Dispute Settlement, 17 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 
471, 477 (1988). 
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of a dispute.68  Since negotiations do not always permit the facts to be established 
objectively and impartially,69 they run the risk of a party denying that a dispute 
exists, advancing unreasonable claims, or dragging its feet.70  Negotiation also al-
lows states to opt for extreme positions that may lead to deadlock since it lacks 
“efficient restraints” on the negotiating parties, it may last for a long period of time 
before reaching a mutually accepted agreement, if any, and it may well end fruit-
lessly.71  Moreover, the goals of the various parties to a negotiation may not be 
achieved as expected and compromises or agreements that were once concluded 
through negotiation may not be put into effect in the following years.72  Ultimately, 
a variety of factors may impinge on any negotiation, including the parties’ systems 
of government, the individual psychology of political leaders, and public opinion.73 
In the context of TFD resolution, negotiation may also prove inadequate to 
protect the interests and positions of weaker states in situations of power asym-
metry74 and water-hegemony, for instance where the parties have “uneven bargain-
ing powers or unequal legal and technical expertise in the matters involved.”75  
Moreover, where states wish to adopt and apply the principles of international water 
law to their dispute, this may prove difficult to do in bilateral negotiations since 
“the objective determination of the equitable and reasonable uses of a transbound-
ary watercourse or whether or not a particular project may result in significant harm 
to another state is, at best, an unworkable exercise” without the involvement of an 
impartial third party.76  This is especially true where the equity and reasonableness 
of a water use, as well as the magnitude of the harm, are mere projections.77  Put 
another way, 
…in the absence of agreement between the states concerned on what 
amounts to an equitable allocation of the uses and benefits of a water-
course, only an impartial third party to whom the question has been en-
trusted by those states can authoritatively determine whether they are uti-
lizing the waters in an equitable and reasonable manner…even assuming 
that [this doctrine] were applied “correctly” by a State acting alone, it 
would be very difficult, and perhaps impossible, to prove conclusively to 
the other states using the watercourse that the first state’s utilization was 
                                                          
 68. Id. at 489, 492. 
 69. Charles Manga Fombad, Consultation and Negotiation in the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes, in INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 52 (Mary Ellen O’Connell ed., 2003). 
 70. Patricia K. Wouters et al., Sharing Transboundary Waters An Integrated Assessment of Equitable 
Entitlement: The Legal Assessment Model 130 (IHP-VI Technical Document in Hydrology No. 74, 
UNESCO Working Series SC 2005/WS/13, 2005), http://unesdoc.unesco.org/im-
ages/0013/001397/139794e.pdf. 
 71. RONGXING GUO, TERRITORIAL DISPUTES AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: THE ART OF AVOIDING 
WAR 134 (2012). 
 72. Id. 
 73. RAYMOND COHEN, NEGOTIATING ACROSS CULTURES: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION IN AN 
INTERDEPENDENT WORLD 18 (Rev. ed., 1997). 
 74. Naho Mirumachi, Mark Zeitous & Jeroen Warner, Transboundary water interactions and the UN 
Watercourses Convention, in THE UN WATERCOURSES CONVENTION IN FORCE: STRENGTHENING 
INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR TRANSBOUNDARY WATER MANAGEMENT 352,  353 (Flavia Rocha Loures & 
Alistair Rieu-Clarke eds., 2013). 
 75. Wouters et al., supra note 70, at 130. 
 76. Gabriel Eckstein, Water Scarcity, Conflict, and Security in a Climate Change World: Challenges 
and Opportunities for International Law and Policy 27 WIS. INT’L L.J. 409, 435 (2009). 
 77. Id. at 453. 
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in fact “equitable” in relation to them. This consideration makes the in-
volvement of a third party all the more important to the doctrine’s proper 
and effective application.78 
With the increasing scarcity of, and demand for, freshwater, the likelihood of 
states being able to achieve such balance on their own diminishes even further, and 
entrusting such determination to a third party may thus be required.  Negotiation 
should therefore be considered merely as the first step states should take to resolve 
a TFD,79 since “working out their troubles on their own or shaking hands and getting 
along may work occasionally, but most of the time the conflict will only be sent 
underground to resurface later in more destructive ways.”80  If negotiations fail or 
if the parties are unable to enter into negotiations at all, other means of dispute set-
tlement based on the involvement of a neutral third party should be considered.81 
B. Third-Party Non-Binding Mechanisms 
Considering the limits of bilateral negotiation, states may wish to involve third 
parties in the resolution of their TFDs to assist them in reaching an amicable settle-
ment.  Non-binding third-party mechanisms such as mediation,82 conciliation,83 
good offices,84 inquiry/fact-finding,85 etc., have been said to offer “flexible reme-
dies” and “may involve more kinds of non-state actors” than both bilateral negotia-
tion and judicial settlement.86  Therefore, these methods may be more suitable for 
“providing concessions and reaching a compromise than direct negotiations.”87  
Such dispute resolution processes may be offered, for instance, by neutral states or 
international organizations, as well as internal or external individuals.88  An indi-
vidual may have the advantage of acting more freely in the mediation process since 
they would not be “encumbered by the world politics outside the dispute, which 
usually affect states and official mediators.”89  Generally, third-party intervention 
                                                          
 78. Stephen C. McCaffrey, The Law of International Watercourses: Present Problems, Future Trends, 
in A LAW FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF WOLFGANG E. BURHENNE 113, 115 (Alex-
andre Kiss & Françoise Burhenne-Guilmin eds., 1994). 
 79. Fombad, supra note 69, at 44-45. 
 80. GUO, supra note 71, at 135. 
 81. Wouters et al., supra note 70, at 130. 
 82. “Where a third party intervenes to reconcile the claims of the contending parties and to advance 
his own proposals aimed at a mutually acceptable compromise solution.” U.N. OFFICE OF LEGAL 
AFFAIRS CODIFICATION DIVISION, HANDBOOK ON PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES BETWEEN 
STATES, at 40, U.N. Sales No. E.92.V.7 (1992). 
 83. This process “combines the elements of both inquiry and mediation” by providing the parties with 
“a better understanding of each other’s case by undertaking objective investigation and evaluation of all 
aspects of the dispute and, on the other hand, provid[ing] them with an informal third-party machinery 
for the negotiation and non-judicial appraisal of each other’s legal and other claims.” Id. at 45. 
 84. This process “seeks to encourage the parties to the dispute to resume negotiations, thus providing 
them with a channel of communication.” Id. at 33. 
 85. The “investigation or elucidation of a disputed issue of fact.” Id. at 24, 26. 
 86. Kristjánsdóttir, supra note 16, at 357. 
 87. Salman M. A. Salman, Mediation of International Water Disputes - the Indus, the Jordan, and the 
Nile Basins Interventions, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FRESHWATER: THE MULTIPLE CHALLENGES 
360, 366 (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Christina Leb & Mara Tignino eds., 2013). 
 88. Wouters et al., supra note 70, at 130. 
 89. Salman, supra note 87, at 364. 
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is more likely to be accepted by the parties when there is a stalemate or when other 
options, particularly the military option, were tried and failed.90 
In the context of TFD resolution, the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention 
(UNWC),91 the main international treaty governing the non-navigational uses of in-
ternational waterways which entered into force in August 2014, provides for dispute 
resolution by negotiation, failing which the parties “may jointly seek the good of-
fices of, or request mediation or conciliation by, a third party, or make use, as ap-
propriate, of any joint watercourse institutions that may have been established by 
them or agree to submit the dispute to arbitration or to the International Court of 
Justice.”92  If after six months the parties have not been able to settle their dispute 
through such means, the Convention provides that the “dispute shall be submitted, 
at the request of any of the parties to the dispute, to impartial fact-finding . . . unless 
the parties otherwise agree.”93  Therefore, the UNWC includes a so-called “compul-
sory system of conciliation”94 through a default option of impartial fact-finding that 
is intended to provide disputing parties with “recommendations . . . for an equitable 
solution of the dispute, which the parties concerned shall consider in good faith.”95  
However, such recommendations are not binding on the parties, nor is there a ref-
erence to international law principles in this mechanism.96 
Moreover, this dispute resolution provision of the UNWC was controversial 
and the number of states that voted against it or abstained (including important 
freshwater states such as India, China, France, Colombia, and Turkey) almost 
equaled the number of votes in its favor.97 Some of the states abstaining claimed 
that the dispute resolution provision did not go far enough in terms of compulsory 
settlement.98  Indeed, several signatory states have declared themselves bound by 
either International Court of Justice (ICJ) adjudication or arbitration for the resolu-
tion of disputes under the Convention, indicating both a need and a desire for more 
robust mechanisms for the resolution of TFDs, at least on the part of some states.99 
Given the heavy reliance in TFDs on “expert recommendations concerning 
technical matters, and the fact that all international water disputes are inevitably 
                                                          
 90. Id. at 366. 
 91. G.A. Res. 51/229, annex, Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses, (July 8, 1997), http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/51/229. 
 92. Id. art. 33(2). 
 93. Id. art. 33(3). 
 94. Caflisch, supra note 17, at 244. 
 95. G.A. Res. 51/229, supra note 91, art. 33(8). 
 96. Caflisch, supra note 17, at 244-45. 
 97. Id. at 244. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Status of the Watercourses Convention, INT’L WATER LAW PROJECT, http://www.internationalwa-
terlaw.org/documents/intldocs/watercourse_status.html (last updated July 31, 2015) (Hungary has de-
clared itself  “…bound by either of the two means for the settlement of disputes (International Court of 
Justice, arbitration), reserving its right to agree on the competent body of jurisdiction, as the case may 
be.”  Montenegro has declared that: “in respect of any dispute not resolved in accordance with Article 
33 paragraph 2 of the said Convention, Montenegro recognizes as compulsory ipso facto, and without 
special agreement in relationship to any party accepting the same obligation: 
1.Submission of the dispute to the International Court of Justice; and/or 
2.Arbitration by an arbitral tribunal established and operating, unless the parties to the dispute otherwise 
agreed, in accordance with the procedure laid down in the annex to the present Convention.” 
The Netherlands has declared that: “in accordance with paragraph 10 of Article 33 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, that it accepts both 
means of dispute settlement referred to in that paragraph as compulsory in relation to any Party accepting 
one or both means of dispute settlement.”). 
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very fact-sensitive,”100 inquiry and fact-finding may be particularly useful in this 
context.  These mechanisms allow states to refer questions to a panel of experts for 
impartial third-party investigation of factual or technical matters, and the Interna-
tional Law Commission (ILC) has opined that fact-finding or inquiry will frequently 
resolve a TFD before any binding process is necessary.101  Another similar mecha-
nism that might prove useful in the context of TFDs is conciliation on the basis of 
expert determination.  A permanent or ad hoc joint institution created by the states 
sharing the freshwater resource may carry out such expert determination, for in-
stance.  Such an institution would ideally include technical experts in addition to 
legal experts, as the former tend to be in the best position to conduct fact-finding 
regarding the watercourse that they were mandated to monitor, and constitute a fo-
rum for resolving disputes on a non-political level.102  In terms of the identity of 
such experts, some suggest that all things being equal, an outsider has a greater 
chance of succeeding since an insider may be part of the problem, may be perceived 
as favoring one of the sides, and the parties may be hesitant to share confidential 
information with such an insider.103 
Ultimately, however, all third-party non-binding mechanisms suffer from a 
common disadvantage that may hinder the effective resolution of TFDs.  They all 
produce a result that fails to “give expression to an affirmative endeavor to effect 
accord between the states at variance” and therefore these states remain free to draw 
their own, potentially divergent, conclusions as to the course to be followed.104  In 
other words, the result these mechanisms produce may reflect the lowest common 
denominator on which the disputing parties could agree rather than a definitive and 
operative solution, and may lead to further conflict concerning their actual applica-
tion in practice.  This may in part explain why mediation of TFDs, for instance, has 
had mixed success.  While at least one such mediation, namely the World Bank 
mediation of the Indus River dispute between India and Pakistan, was successful, 
several other attempted mediations of TFDs were unsuccessful, such as the World 
Bank’s attempt to mediate the Nile River dispute and the United States’ attempt to 
mediate the Jordan River dispute.105 
III. A NEW APPROACH TO INTERSTATE ARBITRATION 
While both bilateral negotiation and third-party non-binding mechanisms have 
their respective advantages, they lack an authoritative framework for compelling 
participation and enforcing agreed-upon outcomes.106  In light of these limitations, 
a procedure for the orderly investigation and resolution107 of disputes is required.  
Moreover, the involvement of international judicial and quasi-judicial institutions 
                                                          
 100. Kristjánsdóttir, supra note 16, at 357. 
 101. Wouters et al., supra note 70, at 131. 
 102. Kristjánsdóttir, supra note 16, at 357-358; Wouters et al., supra note 70, at 131. 
 103. GUO, supra note 71, at 135-36. 
 104. Charles Cheney Hyde, The Place of Commissions of Inquiry and Conciliation Treaties in the 
Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes, in INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 105, 106 (Mary 
Ellen O’Connell ed., 2003). 
 105. Salman, supra note 87, at 369-403. 
 106. Anna Spain, Beyond Adjudication: Resolving International Resource Disputes in an Era Of Cli-
mate Change, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 343, 378 (2011). 
 107. Joseph Dellapenna, The Customary International Law of Internationally Shared Fresh Waters, 1 
INT’L J. GLOBAL ENVTL. ISSUES 264, 277 (2001). 
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has been viewed as beneficial in cases of “regional or global environmental prob-
lems” and in cases of “local transboundary harm,”108 both of which may arise in 
TFDs.  Indeed, many water-related international instruments109 provide for the res-
olution of disputes by way of international adjudication, which has traditionally en-
compassed both judicial settlement and arbitration.110  In the context of TFDs, bind-
ing third-party resolution may in fact “be the only way out if all other means fail 
and if the alternative is a stalemate that will result in an unnecessary prolongation 
of international tension.”111  Nonetheless, states remain reluctant to submit TFDs to 
a purely “legal” mechanism such as judicial settlement by the ICJ.112  States are 
similarly reluctant to use arbitration for the resolution of TFDs.113  The underutili-
zation of arbitration in this context may in part result from its conflation with judi-
cial settlement and the failure of states to recognize it as an independent mecha-
nism.114  Since “international law arbitration is...deeply enmeshed with adjudica-
tion”115 states tend to perceive both as purely legal mechanisms suitable only for 
the resolution of questions of law through the application of legal principles, and 
thus may view them as inappropriate in the context of complex disputes, such as 
TFDs, that involve complex non-legal, political, or vital issues. 
This perception, however, is misguided and flies in the face of the original pur-
pose and true nature of interstate arbitration as a distinct dispute resolution mecha-
nism that is substantively and procedurally different from judicial settlement.  In 
fact, arbitration “may naturally be a general alternative or complement to typically 
judicial or quasi-judicial means”116 and may present the most suitable option for the 
                                                          
 108. CATHRIN ZENGERLING, GREENING INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE: ENVIRONMENTAL NGOS 
BEFORE INTERNATIONAL COURTS, TRIBUNALS, AND COMPLIANCE COMMITTEES 77 (2013). 
 109. See, e.g., Wouters, supra note 61, at 206 (discussing the 1961 Salzburg Resolution, art. 8 and the 
1966 Helsinki Rules, art. XXXIV). 
 110. Spain, supra note 106, at 354. 
 111. Wouters et al., supra note 70, at 133. 
 112. The article focuses on the ICJ since it is the most relevant international forum for the adjudication 
of TFDs. Other potentially relevant regional courts include the European Court of Justice, which may be 
seized to resolve disputes concerning EU water law. Andrea M. Keessen et al., Transboundary river 
basin management in Europe Legal instruments to comply with European water management obliga-
tions in case of transboundary water pollution and floods, 4 UTRECHT L. REV. 35, 44-45 (2008). 
 113. One study indicates that out of 155 peaceful settlements attempts in shared river disputes between 
1816-2001, only seven involved binding resolution by a third party. Stephen E. Gent & Megan Shannon, 
Decision Control and the Pursuit of Binding Conflict Management: Choosing the Ties that Bind, 55 J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 710, 723 (2011). 
 114. Other reasons may include the binding nature of the process, the lack of control over the outcome, 
fear of unfavorable results, reluctance to give a dispute a high international profile, concerns about the 
expense, inconvenience and delay involved in the proceedings, lack of familiarity with international 
judicial procedures, and uncertainty regarding the enforceability of any eventual judgment, 
MCCAFFREY, supra note 14, at 254; Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, Kelly M. Kaderaand & Mark J. C. 
Crescenzi, Practicing Democratic Community Norms: Third-party Conflict Management and Successful 
Settlements, in INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MEDIATION: NEW APPROACHES AND FINDINGS 243 (Jacob 
Bercovitch & Scott Sigmund Gartner eds., 2009); Stephen E. Gent & Megan Shannon, Bias and the 
Effectiveness of Third-Party Conflict Management Mechanisms, 28 CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE SCI. 124 
(2011). 
 115. Martins Paparinskis, Comment to For or Against International Arbitration: A Perspective of In-
ternational Law of Dispute Settlement, EJIL: TALK!, (June 10, 2015, 15:24), http://www.ejiltalk.org/for-
or-against-international-arbitration-a-perspective-of-international-law-of-dispute-settlement/. 
 116. Paulo Canelas de Castro, Prospects for the Future of International Water Law: the View Projected 
by the Epistemic Community, in RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL WATER DISPUTES 371, 408 (Int’l Bu-
reau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration ed., 2003). 
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resolution of TFDs since it is “designed for just such occasions as those where par-
ties prefer to settle their disputes privately and informally, in that it can be designed 
for quick, practical and efficient resolution.”117  This section therefore proposes a 
new approach to interstate arbitration in the context of TFD resolution.  The first 
element of this approach calls for a return to the original purpose and true nature of 
arbitration, which was not intended to constitute a strictly legal mechanism similar 
to judicial settlement118 but was rather viewed as a more flexible, just, and diplo-
matic alternative to it.  The second element sets out to revamp the Optional Rules 
for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Natural Resources and/or the Environment 
(Rules) of the PCA in this quasi-diplomatic spirit of arbitration. 
A. The “True Nature”119 of Interstate Arbitration 
In the times of ancient Greece and China, arbitration was distinguished from 
determinations by judges because an arbitrator could consider the equity of the case, 
whereas a judge was bound by the letter of the law.120  Such “equity” included 
“every thing, which it is more proper to do than to omit, even beyond what is re-
quired by the express rules of justice.”121  Compromissory clauses providing for 
dispute resolution by arbitration were included in interstate treaties as far back as 
418 B.C., when a treaty of peace between Sparta and Argos was concluded.122  Ar-
bitration was used in those times to resolve a wide variety of interstate issues rang-
ing from frontiers to breaches of peace by armed attack.123  The use of interstate 
arbitration continued during the Middle Ages, “offering the singular spectacle of 
conciliation and peace advancing between populations of the most warlike charac-
ter.”124  Arbitration was often resorted to not only to prevent wars but also to end 
them by utilizing both its “legal” and “diplomatic” dimensions to reconcile the par-
ties and re-establish peace125 in accordance with the rules of law and “in the most 
useful and suitable way.”126 
The modern era of interstate arbitration is commonly viewed as commencing 
with the signing of the Jay Treaty of 1794 between Great Britain and the United 
States, which was designed to resolve various disputes between the two countries 
that threatened to result in war.127 With respect to three such disputes that were not 
settled in the Treaty itself, including one concerning territory, it provided for reso-
lution by a quasi-diplomatic arbitral process that combined legal proceedings and 
diplomatic negotiations128 and retained many of the traditional two-dimensional 
                                                          
 117. GUO, supra note 71, at 140. 
 118. Settlement by an international permanent court operating on the basis of predetermined procedural 
rules and producing binding decisions based on the applicable rules of international law. Caflisch, supra 
note 17, at 236; ZENGERLING, supra note 108, at 79. 
 119. Pinto, supra note 22, at 44. 
 120. M.C.W. Pinto, The Prospects for International Arbitration: Inter-State Disputes, in 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: PAST AND PROSPECTS 63, 65 (A.H.A. Soons ed., 1990). 
 121. Id. 
 122. JACKSON H. RALSTON, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION FROM ATHENS TO LOCARNO 157 (1929). 
 123. Id. at 158. 
 124. Id. at 176. 
 125. Id. at 181. 
 126. Id. at 180. 
 127. Pinto, supra note 120, at 66. 
 128. The commissions were comprised solely of the parties’ nationals, which some argue “encouraged 
a high level of consensus-seeking.” Charles H. II. Brower, The Functions and Limits of Arbitration and 
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features of arbitration.  For instance, in one of these disputes the parties were silent 
regarding how the arbitration commission was to decide, and it based its decision 
largely on equity and did not become too involved in the application of international 
law.129  The remaining two disputes, moreover, were explicitly to be decided ac-
cording to “justice, equity and the law of nations.”130 
The successful settlements achieved by some of the arbitral commissions under 
the Jay Treaty have largely been credited to their “spirit of negotiation and compro-
mise”131 and to the arbitrators acting “as negotiators rather than as judges.”132  While 
they satisfied the legal dimension of the arbitral process by issuing reasoned awards 
based on the application of legal principles, these commissions were considered to 
work best where the subject-matter of the dispute allowed the commissioners to 
give a measure of satisfaction to both sides since this permitted them to employ the 
diplomatic dimension of arbitration in order to produce an effective and fair out-
come.133  The success of these arbitrations, among others,134 resulted in a steady 
increase in the number of interstate arbitration agreements during the nineteenth 
century.135  These often instructed the arbitrators to decide “according to justice” or 
“according to principles of justice and equity,”136 thereby emphasizing their role as 
“diplomats” rather than “judges.”  Moreover, at a Conference of the Association for 
the Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations137 in 1873 it was unanimously 
agreed that arbitration was to be regarded “as a means essentially just and reasona-
ble, and even obligatory on all nations, of terminating international differences 
which cannot be settled by negotiation.”138  At a later seating of the Conference, 
while defining one of the objects of the Association as “the question of International 
Law,” it was repeated that “the principal object, nevertheless, [was] to be Arbitra-
tion as a means of settlement of all differences between nations,”139 whether involv-
ing legal or non-legal issues. 
However, this rise in prominence of interstate arbitration was essentially an 
“Atlantic movement” spearheaded by the states of Europe and America, and thus it 
became greatly influenced by the European legal tradition and as a result gradually 
evolved into a search for “orderly” dispute settlement through the application of law 
and institutionalized “compulsory arbitration,”140 culminating in the 1899 and 1907 
                                                          
Judicial Settlement Under Private and Public International Law 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 259, 266, 
270-271 (2008); KAJ HOBÉR, ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 3-4 (2005). 
 129. HOBÉR, supra note 128, at 4, 8. 
 130. Pinto, supra note 120, at 85; RALSTON, supra note 122, at 191-192; HOBÉR, supra note 128, at 5-
6. 
 131. Pinto, supra note 22, at 59. 
 132. Pinto, supra note 120, at 68 (quoting J.L. SIMPSON & H. FOX, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: 
LAW AND PRACTICE 3 (1959)). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Such as the 1814 arbitrations between the United States and Great Britain under the Treaty of 
Ghent and the 1871 Alabama claims Arbitration under the Treaty of Washington. Pinto, supra note 120, 
at 72; HOBÉR, supra note 128, at 13-18; Henry T. King Jr. & James D. Graham, Origins of Modern 
International Arbitration 12 DISP. RESOL. J. 42, 46 (1996). 
 135. Pinto, supra note 120, at 69. 
 136. Id. at 85; HOBÉR, supra note 128, at 13. 
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 138. Henry Richard, The Recent Progress of International Arbitration: A Paper, in ARBITRATION: TWO 
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 139. Id. 
 140. Pinto, supra note 120, at 70-72; Pinto, supra note 22, at 60. 
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Hague Peace Conferences and the establishment of the PCA.141  Thus began the 
“judicialization”142 process of interstate arbitration, whereby international agree-
ments require that arbitral decisions be based on international law,143 and settlement 
incorporating “diplomatic adjustment” is viewed as biased and fundamentally 
flawed.144  The view that only such “judicial” arbitration based on law should be 
“arbitration properly so called” quickly followed and has become the conventional 
wisdom.145 
This modern “judicialized” conception of interstate arbitration, however, while 
perhaps introducing clarity and procedural order into its practice, arguably also de-
terred many states from using it in the context of complex interstate disputes that 
are not amenable to resolution based solely on legal principles.146  In addition, the 
strong non-legal dimensions of most interstate disputes and the growing “dichot-
omy between international legality and justice” led to a period of decline in the use 
of interstate arbitration in the 1930s.147  Therefore, “as the rules governing arbitra-
tion grew in comprehensiveness, completeness and legal precision, so did recourse 
to arbitration as a means of resolving disputes decline.”148  Interstate arbitration has 
thus gradually transitioned from a mechanism that “emphasizes settlement of a dis-
pute” to an essentially judicial mechanism that “emphasizes the application of law 
to the dispute.”149  As a result, it has come to be treated by states with “wariness 
and circumspection,”150 excluding from its purview any dispute that cannot be de-
cided strictly on the basis of law.151 
It should be noted that, notwithstanding this decline in the use of interstate ar-
bitration, since the 1970s it has gradually regained some of its credence with the 
drafting of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules in 1976, the creation of the Iran-United States 
Claim Tribunal in 1981, and the revival of the PCA during the 1990s and the first 
decade of the twenty-first century.152  Indeed, the range of disputes involving states 
that are submitted to arbitration nowadays is extremely broad, and includes disputes 
concerning treaty interpretation,153 maritime and fisheries,154 trade,155 diplomatic 
                                                          
 141. Even though the PCA remains an administrative institution that does not function as a traditional 
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protection,156 and foreign investment.157  However, in most cases the issues submit-
ted for resolution remain largely legal, and arbitrators tend to decide them as 
“judges” on the basis of strict application of international law rather than on the 
basis of “justice” or “equity,” thereby perpetuating the judicialized form of modern 
interstate arbitration.158  As the distinction between arbitration and judicial settle-
ment continues to fade, so does the prospect of states willingly arbitrating more 
sensitive disputes.159 
In order to revive the use of arbitration in the resolution of such sensitive inter-
state disputes such as TFDs it should be understood as the distinct, quasi-diplomatic 
process it was originally intended to be, in which “dispassionate intermediaries 
bring the facts of a dispute to light, evaluate rival claims based on their merits, and 
make a judgment grounded in justice, equity, and respect for international law.”160  
This perception of arbitration places it midway between judicial settlement and non-
legal mechanisms on the spectrum of interstate dispute resolution processes.  Unlike 
non-legal mechanisms such as negotiation or mediation, arbitration offers a final 
and binding third-party resolution, which is likely to be perceived as more legiti-
mate by the parties and is especially effective where they have failed, or are un-
likely, to reach a consensual agreement.161  In TFDs in particular, domestic political 
conditions or the national value attributed to a disputed water resource may prevent 
leaders from making voluntary concessions in negotiation or mediation, which may 
then result in deadlock and stalemate.162  Therefore, a process conducted by an im-
partial third party that “assure[s] to the disputants an opportunity for the presenta-
tion of proofs and reasoned argument”163 and that results in a binding decision that 
is subject to a “standard of rationality that is different from that imposed on the 
results of an exchange,”164 may in some cases present the only feasible way to settle 
a TFD.  While judicial settlement by the ICJ also offers final and binding third-party 
dispute resolution, it should be distinguished from arbitration in at least three fun-
damental respects: its purpose, the nature of the process, and its effectiveness. 
i. Purpose 
Unlike adjudication by the ICJ, arbitration is intended to be carried out by tri-
bunals with no continued existence, tasked solely with resolving the particular dis-
pute before them.  As a result, complex matters such as prestige, symbolic value, 
historical antipathies, and competition of power, which are prominent in many 
TFDs, are likely to be better addressed in arbitration than in judicial settlement by 
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a permanent court.165  While it cannot be denied that there are some advantages to 
a permanent judicial body that can facilitate the “homogeneous development” of 
international water law through uniform interpretations of principles and consistent 
judgments,166 the limited applicability of international legal principles to region-
specific and highly technical-scientific TFDs arguably renders such development a 
secondary objective to the effective and practical resolution of these disputes.  This 
is so since TFDs are complex and cross-disciplinary problems in which “a focus on 
legal solutions . . . is likely to prove insufficient”167 and “practical justice” that fo-
cuses on feasible outcomes and resolves the dispute on the ground, rather than 
merely proclaims the parties’ respective legal rights and obligations, should be pre-
ferred.  Such justice is more likely to be achieved in arbitration since rather than 
deciding which party is legally right or wrong, it operates to achieve a negotiated 
settlement.168 
ii. Nature of the process 
Unlike the largely fixed composition of the ICJ,169 in arbitration state parties 
are free to choose their decision makers.170  This allows them to appoint arbitrators 
with specific non-legal expertise, or who are familiar with the particular dispute and 
the parties’ interests, which is likely to inspire greater confidence in the arbitral 
tribunal.171  This ability is particularly significant in TFDs, which unlike disputes in 
other areas of international law, often include technical aspects that must be en-
trusted to experts and increasingly require broad, interdisciplinary technical 
skills.172  It has therefore been said that “the inclusion and understanding of tech-
nical information in the decision-making process can only serve to achieve more 
balanced, scientifically based, and thoughtful decisions.”173  While the ICJ did in-
clude at one point a Specialized Chamber for Environmental Matters, which might 
have been more suitable for the resolution of TFDs, it has never been used and has 
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not been reconstituted since 2006.174  The failure of the Specialized Chamber was 
largely due to the fact that it retained most of the structural and procedural short-
comings of the ICJ - it did not provide a process that was more expedient, cheaper, 
or less formal than the full Court and the appointed judges did not have a wider 
knowledge of international environmental law.175  Furthermore, even though the 
ICJ may appoint experts to assist it in deciding TFDs, it has not done so in previous 
disputes and has been criticized for failing to deal with scientific uncertainty in a 
progressive manner through deeper interaction with the experts, thereby missing 
“an opportunity to established itself as a careful and systematic court that can be 
entrusted with complex scientific evidence in the resolution of international dis-
putes.”176 
In addition to selecting their decision-makers, state parties retain considerable 
control over the course of the arbitral process since they can design their own arbi-
tration agreement and decide on the procedural and substantive rules to be applied 
by the tribunal.177  They can also determine the rules under which scientific and 
technical evidence will be examined and treated, rather than be subject to the pre-
scribed rules of a particular judicial forum.178  As already noted, the role of technical 
and scientific data in TFD resolution is significant, and the ICJ is arguably ill 
equipped to evaluate and incorporate such data in its decision-making.  In the 
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case,179 for instance, the ICJ rendered its decision without 
evaluating either the effects of the disputed measure on the region’s environment, 
or the data concerning the amount and quality of water required to maintain a bal-
anced natural and human environment.180 
Furthermore, arbitration, where properly understood, involves a more contex-
tual and broad interpretation and application of non-legal or equitable principles,181 
which is particularly advantageous to the resolution of TFDs in light of the contro-
versial state of international water law and since the resolution of such disputes may 
depend as much upon the balancing of competing interests as upon the ascertain-
ment and application of legal rules.182  Arbitration assigns to law a “basic but by no 
means exclusive function,”183 and arbitrators are therefore not as concerned with 
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stating the law and settling the dispute by strict application of legal rules184 as they 
are with reconciling national interests, easing tensions, encouraging lasting co-op-
eration, and achieving an acceptable settlement.185 
This is of particular importance where a dispute involves more than strictly 
legal questions, as is the case in many TFDs, and where equitable considerations 
form the basis for determining rights and obligations also under applicable legal 
principles.186  Since in TFDs the facts and circumstances of each dispute, rather than 
any a priori rule, will ultimately be the determinants of the rights and obligations 
of the parties,187 the mechanism selected for their resolution should be able to ef-
fectively account for non-legal issues and guarantee states a fair and practical solu-
tion.  Ultimately, international law must play a role in the resolution of TFDs, but 
this should not necessarily be a leading role.  As one scholar has noted, “interna-
tional law in itself does not provide solutions for conflicts of water uses” but “there 
is no answer to water problems without international law.”188  The quasi-diplomatic 
true nature of arbitration is arguably best suited for balancing legal and non-legal 
considerations and ensuring that local norms or practices and changing circum-
stances that are not reflected in the principles of international water law are properly 
taken into account in the resolution of TFDs.189 
iii. Effectiveness 
Unlike the zero-sum nature of judicial settlement, which emanates from its 
rigid procedures and adherence to legal rules, arbitration is better able to produce a 
compromise solution that avoids a winner-takes-all outcome190 and is therefore 
more likely to generate among disputing parties a sense of having been treated 
fairly.191  This may make the process appear less risky for states engulfed in disputes 
involving political or vital interests, which in turn may improve the prospects of 
successful implementation of arbitral decisions.192  Such compromise solutions are 
particularly important in TFDs, where cooperation and coexistence among states 
should arguably take precedence over pronouncement of their legal rights.193  Arbi-
tral awards are also more likely to be complied with by states since they exert “legal, 
moral and diplomatic force.”194  This is so not only because states prefer to avoid 
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the political and reputational costs of non-compliance,195 but mainly because state 
parties become personally invested in the arbitral process by controlling the issues 
submitted for resolution, the procedural and substantive rules governing the pro-
cess, and the identity of the arbitrators.196 
This “true nature” of arbitration therefore enables it to provide a “genuine al-
ternative method of dispute settlement.”197  The extent of party control over the 
arbitral proceedings, coupled with the possibility of having non-jurists render bind-
ing decisions on the basis of extra-legal considerations and in accordance with the 
particular circumstances of the case, distinguish interstate arbitration both from 
non-binding mechanisms and from judicial settlement by a permanent international 
court.198  Unfortunately, interstate arbitration has lost this original quality in its 
modern form as a result of the prevalent misconception that arbitration and judicial 
settlement represent a “distinction without a difference.”199 
B. The PCA and TFDs 
The second element in the proposed approach to interstate arbitration in the 
resolution of TFDs sets out to revamp the Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes 
Relating to Natural Resources and/or the Environment (Rules) of the PCA.  Estab-
lished in 1899, “the PCA is an intergovernmental organization tasked with facilitat-
ing arbitration and other modes of dispute resolution between states, state entities, 
intergovernmental organizations, and private parties.”200  While it does not operate 
as a permanent international arbitral body, it does have a permanent institutional 
basis and the PCA secretariat receives requests for arbitration, assists in the selec-
tion of arbitrators, facilitates the conduct of arbitrations, and promotes the services 
offered by the court to potential litigants.201 
In 2001, the PCA adopted the Rules, which seek to “address the principal lacu-
nae in environmental dispute resolution.”202  The Rules are based on the 1976 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules “but were modified to reflect the unique characteris-
tics of disputes relating to natural resources, conservation or environmental protec-
tion.”203  The Rules are optional in that they can only be used pursuant to the agree-
ment of the parties when a specific dispute arises, unless they were incorporated by 
reference in an environmental agreement.204  Despite being designed specifically 
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for disputes concerning environmental issues, the Rules have been scarcely em-
ployed by states to resolve environmental disputes, and have not been used at all in 
the context of transboundary freshwater disputes.  There have only been six cases 
commenced under the Rules; four concerned Emissions Reduction Purchase Agree-
ments and two concerned contractual agreements relating to emission reductions 
projects.205  In three of these cases, moreover, both parties were private entities, in 
one case the respondent was a public limited company, in one case the respondent 
was a private entity wholly owned by a public limited company, and in one case the 
respondent was a government agency.206  The Rules have been included in one mul-
tilateral instrument that concerns water issues,207 but have yet to be employed in the 
resolution of TFDs.208 Nonetheless, the Rules do offer several advantages in this 
context. 
First, they provide procedural rules that can expedite the arbitral process and 
prevent deadlock where, for instance, the parties cannot decide on the arbitrators or 
the procedure for their appointment.209  Moreover, the Rules include specific provi-
sions for multiparty disputes, which can facilitate the participation of multiple states 
in the resolution of TFDs,210 as well as provisions for the resolution of disputes that 
do not reference an applicable treaty or convention,211 which is particularly useful 
in TFDs where the allocation or use of water is not set out in an agreement.  Another 
advantage of the Rules is that they combine the benefits of a permanent and well-
respected administrative institution, on the one hand, and an ad-hoc process, on the 
other hand.  The main benefit of an existing body is that it already benefits from the 
support of states.212  Establishing a new permanent water court or tribunal would 
only “add a further layer of institutional complexity to the patchwork of jurisdic-
tions already operating in the environmental field, with all the implications this car-
ries both for increased jurisdictional competition and conflict, and for the possible 
fragmentation of international law.”213  Moreover, while a permanent forum with 
compulsory jurisdiction may be desirable in some respects, there appears to be little 
appetite in the international community for such a forum in the environmental con-
text,214 and even less so in the context of TFDs.  As for the benefits of an ad hoc 
process, one of the reasons for the success of arbitration in environmental disputes 
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is that “most of them have taken place on an ad hoc basis….”215  Moreover, the 
record of state compliance has been said to be “far more mixed when environmental 
litigation is commenced unilaterally on the basis of compulsory procedures.”216  
Therefore, the PCA and the Rules provide disputing states with the benefits of a 
prescribed yet flexible procedure as well as institutional support, and can therefore 
be useful in the resolution of TFDs.  However, they should be “sensitized”217 and 
adapted to this specific context. 
For instance, the Rules currently presume that the arbitral proceedings will be 
confidential, unless the parties agree otherwise.218  This has been criticized for run-
ning against the prevailing trend in both domestic and international environmental 
law to open environmental decision-making processes to public scrutiny and par-
ticipation.  It may also be seen as problematic in the TFD context since transparency 
is essential for ensuring that arbitrators remain accountable to the international com-
munity in deciding such disputes in accordance with prevailing environmental 
standards and values.219  However, some degree of confidentiality may also facili-
tate the resolution of TFDs by way of arbitration since it would protect information 
impacting national security220 and would allow states to obtain a binding decision 
in a process that is more in line with the quasi-diplomatic true nature of arbitration.  
Still, the strict presumption in favor of confidentiality should be relaxed in the TFD 
context, for instance by requiring that the final award be made public.  Keeping 
arbitral awards confidential “lags behind the practice of public international law” 
and particularly in TFDs that affect interests beyond those of the parties to the arbi-
tration, a potential lack of award publication can leave parties without access to the 
arbitral proceedings further disenfranchised.221  Moreover, since the established 
practice of other international courts and tribunals, such as the International Tribu-
nal for the Law of the Sea, the ICJ, and the judicial bodies operating under the WTO 
and ICSID systems, is to publish decisions, it is unlikely that states would be de-
terred from using the Rules if they included a similar provision.222 
In terms of composition and powers of the arbitrators, the Rules could provide 
that unless the parties agree otherwise arbitral tribunals shall include at least one 
relevant scientist or technical expert, rather than rely on expert witnesses that have 
no decision-making authority.223  The Rules could also expressly authorize arbitral 
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tribunals to reach compromise solutions by considering all relevant circumstances, 
including non-legal factors.  For instance, the Rules could provide that arbitral tri-
bunals shall decide on the basis of “respect for” international law224 as well as hy-
drological, geographical, economic, political, and cultural considerations that may 
be relevant in the particular case.225  This would serve to acknowledge that “the job 
of arbitrators . . . should be to arrive at politically viable compromises rather than 
simply ‘legally correct’ decisions.”226 
Furthermore, the Rules currently allow for disputes involving parties other than 
states, including international organizations and private parties,227 but they do not 
address the issue of the participation of non-State actors as amicus curiae in inter-
state disputes.228  Since resolving TFDs requires assessing the full range of issues, 
needs, interests, and demands of the relevant parties and addressing those most af-
fected by the outcome, the Rules should explicitly allow for the participation of 
relevant non-state actors as amicus curiae with leave of the arbitral tribunal.229  Rel-
evant NGOs, for instance, “might bring to the attention of the parties and the [arbi-
tral tribunal] . . . legal arguments and factual information that is not known to them 
or not brought forward by the parties because it does not serve their interests.”230  
In TFDs, in particular, “[i]ncreased participation by diverse actors reshapes the dis-
course from legal rights over sovereignty and territory to interest-based problem 
solving”231 and can ensure that local customs and practices of water-use and sharing 
are taken into account in the arbitral decision-making.  This, in turn, “ensures the 
availability of culturally and contextually appropriate practices” and creates a flex-
ible system capable of adapting to new circumstances and avoiding undue constraint 
imposed by legal precedents that are detached from the reality on the ground.232  
States should also be explicitly allowed to include non-state actors in their delega-
tions in hearings before arbitral tribunals, and tribunals should be authorized to con-
sider unsolicited submissions by non-state entities.233  Even if documents provided 
in arbitral proceedings are not accessible to the general public they should arguably 
be made available to selected relevant NGOs.234  Such NGOs could be selected 
through an accreditation system that would filter the organizations that are allowed 
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to contribute to and participated in arbitral proceedings and set out rules governing 
access.235 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Interstate arbitration was originally conceived as a sensitive, albeit law-ori-
ented mechanism, but has been gradually transformed into a system of “high legal 
refinement” that is functionally assimilated with judicial settlement.236  It has thus 
become “an engine of adjudication indistinguishable from its judicial counter-
part.”237  This perception of arbitration, however, is detrimental to the peaceful res-
olution of complex interstate disputes such as TFDs since judicial settlement may 
prove “unhelpful, irrelevant, overly adversarial, and simply too abstract”238 in this 
context.  Moreover, international water law as currently formulated is arguably in-
adequate, in and of itself, as a tool for the resolution of TFDs and states therefore 
tend to avoid what they perceive to be “legal” dispute resolution mechanisms.  At 
the same time, bilateral negotiation and third-party non-binding mechanisms may 
also prove inadequate for the resolution of TFDs.  It is precisely in these intractable 
cases that the original and true nature of arbitration should be revived so that it may 
serve as an effective dispute resolution alternative in which “arbitrators can dis-
pense with legal formalities and may apply whatever procedural rules and substan-
tive law best fit a case.”239  Used in this way, arbitration is able to account for both 
legal and non-legal considerations, adapt to the particular circumstances of the dis-
pute, and provide maximum control to the state parties while producing a binding 
decision that avoids deadlock. 
This Article does not suggest that there are no advantages to purely diplomatic 
or strictly legal dispute resolution mechanisms, or combinations of these.240  Neither 
does it claim that arbitration is a panacea for all TFDs, or that it does not require 
states’ good faith and political will to make peace rather than wage war, as do all 
interstate dispute resolution mechanisms.  Indeed, the choice of the means to be 
used in the resolution of TFDs largely depends on the nature of the case to be de-
cided and on the approach of the disputing states.241  Rather, this Article is intended, 
first, to serve as a reminder of arbitration’s original purpose and its potential to 
provide “mediatory decisions, exempt from the strict norms of the law of nations” 
and thereby resolve “the Gordian knot of non-legal disputes.”242  Second, it offers 
a practical way for doing so by revamping the PCA Rules.  Ultimately, it is only 
through a comprehensive consideration of the relevant legal and policy issues, as 
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well as the underlying science involved243 that states will be able to resolve their 
TFDs effectively and in such a way that the disputed resource suffices for present 
needs and preserved for future generations,244 and such consideration is best under-
taken in arbitration. 
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